Disability, Leave & Health Management Blog : Attorneys & Lawyers for Employer Legal Protections in Businesses Nationwide

“Severe obesity” is a disability under the ADA and a plaintiff need not prove an underlying physiological basis for it, according to a Louisiana federal court. The court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment. EEOC v. Resources for Human Dev., E.D. La., 12/7/11).

Noting that there is no federal law prohibiting discrimination based on obesity, the court reviewed decisions by courts of appeals which had previously considered whether obesity is a disability under federal laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of a disability. The Second and Sixth Circuits had held in ADA cases that morbid obesity was not an impairment, and thus not a disability under the ADA, except where the obesity related to a physiological disorder. The First Circuit had held in a Rehabilitation Act case that morbid obesity was a physical impairment.

The plaintiff oversaw a day care program for children. When hired, she weighed more than 400 pounds; when terminated eight years later, she weighed 527 pounds.  She died while her discrimination charge was pending; the EEOC filed this suit on behalf of her estate.

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Employers who use financial incentives to motivate employees to complete health risk appraisals as part of their group health plans can breathe a little easier.  Relying on the ADA's "safe harbor" for insurance practices, a Florida federal district court has rejected a class action lawsuit challenging Broward County's use of a $20 surcharge to motivate completion of a health risk appraisal. 

As we previously reported, this case is extremely important for many employers.  Health risk appraisals often are the cornerstones of wellness programs and financial incentives are critically important tools to drive employee participation and, in turn, outcomes.

Because the Court found that the employer's actions were protected by the ADA's safe harbor provisions, it did not decide the employer's alternative argument that the wellness program was a voluntary wellness program under the ADA. 

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The EEOC has released an unofficial version of the much-awaited Final Regulations implementing the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA). The official version, published in the Federal Register, will be released tomorrow. The Final Regulations become effective 60 days from March 25, 2011, the day they will be published in the Federal Register, The EEOC also has posted Questions and Answers and a Fact Sheet on the Final Rule. Our Disability, Leave and Health Management Practice Group is reviewing the Final Regulations and will analyze the practical implications they will have for ADA compliance and defense strategies. Stay tuned.

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Congress confirmed last week President Obama’s recess appointments of two employee leave mavens as EEOC Commissioners as well as the EEOC Chair and General Counsel. The EEOC now has a full complement of members with confirmed appointments.

EEOC Commissioners Chai Feldblum, a former Georgetown University Law Professor, and Victoria Lipnic, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Labor, have been serving under recess appointments since April 2010.   Commissioner Feldbum was confirmed for a term expiring on July 1, 2013; Commissioner Lipnic’s term will expire on July 1, 2015.

Both Commissioners have been in the vanguard on employee leave issues. Commissioner Feldblum was involved in drafting and negotiating the Americans with Disabilities Act and the 2009 Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act. Also, while at Georgetown, Feldblum was the Co-Director of Workplace Flexibility 2010 , a public policy initiative which advocates for flexible work arrangements, including time off.

During Commissioner Lipnic’s tenure at the DOL, the agency proposed revised FMLA regulations, evaluated comments on that proposal and issued final revised regulations, which went into effect in January 2009. The FMLA entitles eligible employees to time off from work and these regulations define the parameters of that entitlement.

Congress also confirmed the nomination of Jacqueline A. Berrien to be Chair of the EEOC and David Lopez to be General Counsel. Ms. Berrien and Mr. Lopez had also been serving under recess appointments.

Leave and disability related issues will fare prominently on the EEOC’s 2011 agenda. The EEOC’s final regulations on GINA are effective in January 2011.  Disability and leave management attorneys eagerly await the EEOC’s final rule to implement the equal employment provisions of the ADA Amendments Act. The EEOC had stated in its recent Semiannual Regulatory Agenda that it “plans to issue a final rule by the end of December, 2010” subject to expedited review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. With but hours left in 2010, the EEOC has not yet published the final rule. Also, for FY 2009, the most recent period for reported statistics, the number of disability charges filed with the EEOC exceeded, 21,000, the most ever. Add to this the fact that courts are just now beginning to decide cases under the ADA Amendments Act and one can comfortably speculate that the challenges facing employers to manage workplace disability issues, including attendance and leaves, will grow in 2011.

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We posted recently about GINA’s prohibiting an employer from “actively” listening to conversations between colleagues in which they discuss their genetic information, including family medical history, and how it will limit an employer’s internet searches of applicants and employees. Add casual conversations, sometimes referred to as "water cooler" conversation, to the list of workplace activities curtailed by GINA.

Title II of GINA prohibits the use of genetic information in employment, restricts employers from requesting, requiring or purchasing genetic information, and limits employers from disclosing genetic information. This general prohibition does not apply where an employer “inadvertently” requests genetic information of the individual or the individual’s family member. Is acquisition of such information about an individual obtained from that individual or third parties during a casual conversation inadvertent?

It depends on the nature of the questions asked, according to the recently issued EEOC regulations.  Suppose an employee or employee’s family member was just diagnosed with cancer. A supervisor or manager may make a “general health inquiry” such as “How are you?” or “Did they catch it early?” or “How does your [family member] feel today?” or “Will your [family member] be OK?,” according to the regulations. If the supervisor or manager stops there, there is no GINA violation.

But if the supervisor or manager follows up those general inquiries “with questions that are probing in nature, such as whether other family members have the condition, or whether the individual has been tested for the condition,” the supervisor or manager has crossed that line into illegal requesting because these questions “are likely to result in the acquisition of genetic information.”  

Illegal internet searches. Illegal listening. Illegal casual conversations. GINA is about much more than just DNA.  This nuanced inquiry distinction gives employers a strong reason to train supervisors and managers to make sure their "water cooler" conversations do not include illegal requesting!  

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When is an employer’s searching the internet about applicants and employees illegal? Until now, perhaps not at all, but GINA is about to change that.  We posted recently that the EEOC released final regulations for Title II--the employment provisions--of GINA. Title II prohibits the use of genetic information in employment, restricts employers from requesting, requiring or purchasing genetic information, and limits employers from disclosing genetic information.  An employer who “conduct[s] an Internet search on an individual in a way that is likely to result in a covered entity obtaining genetic information,” which includes family medical history, has engaged in illegal requesting, according to those regs.  It is unclear what type of search would “likely result” in an employer’s obtaining genetic information. One commentator suggested that the EEOC in its regs specifically prohibit an employer from searching an employee’s name and a genetic marker. While the EEOC did not accept this specific recommendation, the language it adopted might encompass such a search. Alternatively, if an employer searches an applicant and is directed to a family genealogy page, it is hard to imagine that such a search would “likely result” in obtaining genetic information...unless the employer clicks on the “family medical history” tab.

Lest any employer representative be concerned about the information shared with “friends" on Facebook and other social media, who might also be applicants and employees, the EEOC noted specifically  that there is no GINA violation when the supervisor or manager “inadvertently learns genetic information from a social media platform which he or she was given permission to access by the creator of the profile at issue (e.g. a supervisor and employee are connected on a social networking site and the employee provides family medical history on his page).”

Employers should also note that in a growing number of employment lawsuits, plaintiff’s seek and obtain “ESI,” electronically stored information, which may include emails and a record of internet searches. Make sure your ESI is not evidence of a GINA violation.

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President Obama earlier this month signed “Rosa’s Law” which replaces the term “mental retardation” with “intellectual disability” in federal education, health and labor laws. Named after a young girl in Maryland with Down Syndrome whose family successfully led the effort to change the terminology in Maryland, the law states that for purposes of the amended statutes and implementing regulations, a reference to an “intellectual disability” shall mean a condition previously referred to as “mental retardation” and a reference to “individuals with intellectual disabilities” shall be a reference to those previously referred to as “individuals with mental retardation.”   Based on the federal government’s change in terminology, watch for more states to pass similar measures.    

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Since the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act was not retroactive, ADA court decisions addressing facts that arose prior to  January 1, 2009, the ADAAA’s effective date, have continued to apply the original ADA, including the now-overruled Supreme Court decisions in the Sutton trilogy and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.

Now, nearly 20 months after the ADAAA, cases based on facts occurring after January 1, 2009  have made their way through the EEOC administrative process and have reached court.  Perhaps the first ADAAA decision to reach the summary judgment stage illustrates the stark contrast between the original ADA and the ADAAA when it comes to the definition of disability.

In Hoffman v. Carefirst of Fort Wayne, Inc. d/b/a Advanced Healthcare, the plaintiff had Stage III renal cancer.  The defendant argued that the plaintiff did not have a disability under the ADA because there was no substantial limitation on a major life activity, noting that his cancer was in remission during the period that gave rise to the litigation, and he did not have any work restrictions, performed his regular job duties and did not miss any significant time from work.

The federal district court in Indiana rejected this argument summarily since the ADAAA states  that “[a]n impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” The court noted that renal cancer would have substantially limited a major life activity when it was active. The court also relied on the EEOC’s proposed regulations  to implement the ADAAA, which lists cancer as an impairment “that will consistently meet the definition of disability.” Under the original ADA, many courts, after conducting an individualized assessment to determine whether a plaintiff with cancer was substantially limited in a major life activity, had concluded that the plaintiff was not an individual with a disability.

Given the timing of the litigation process, expect a growing number of decisions arising under the ADAAA. Given the breadth of the ADAAA, expect also that many more plaintiffs will  meet the ADAAA’s definition of disability than met the original definition. Watch also for the EEOC’s  final regulations to implement Title 1 of the ADAAA. While the date for these regulations to be issued is uncertain, it has been more than a year since the EEOC published proposed regulations.

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Reassigning an employee to a “vacant” position is a form of reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Determining whether a position is “vacant” is usually pretty easy, but not always, as illustrated by recent decisions by the Tenth and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals.

In Duvall v. Georgia Pacific, the plaintiff sought reassignment to a position occupied by temporary contract workers. Is a position filled by a temp “vacant”? The Tenth Circuit held that since the position filled by the temp was not available to a similarly situated, non-disabled employee, it was not “vacant” and was not available to the plaintiff.

Three weeks after Duvall, in McFadden v. Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, the D.C. Circuit relied more on Webster’s Dictionary and, without articulating the Duvall analysis, ended up in pretty much the same place. The plaintiff sought reassignment as the receptionist, claiming the position was vacant because a temp was filling in for the regular receptionist, who was on medical leave. The Court concluded that the regular receptionist “held, filled or occupied” (words from Webster’s) the receptionist position, so that it was not “vacant.” The Court’s discussion suggested that it also recognized that the employer had not made the receptionist position available generally. The Court said that the employer had not sought a replacement for the regular receptionist, had not posted a job listing, and had not “otherwise acted as though it considered the position vacant.”

According to the EEOC’s Guidance, a position is “vacant” if it is available when the employee asks for reasonable accommodation or a position that the employer knows will become available within a reasonable period of time.

Other issues can complicate an employer’s responsibility to consider reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation, such as: Must an employer train the employee to be reassigned, or provide a period of familiarization? How long after the request for reassignment does the obligation to identify vacancies end? And of course, the significant issue that the Supreme Court had agreed to hear, and then dismissed as moot when the parties settled their dispute: whether a disabled employee seeking a vacant position as an accommodation, and who meets the minimum qualifications of the position  is entitled to it, i.e., receives a mandatory preference, or must compete with others for the position.

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We readily conceded that our recent post concerning the Hooters waitress placed on “weight probation” was “not your typical weight discrimination” case. Here is a more typical one, which also addresses whether an employer may consider the “worst case scenario,” so to speak, in determining whether an employee is a qualified individual with a disability.  In Wilkerson v. Shinseki, the employer’s doctor concluded that the plaintiff, a 338 pound boiler plant operator with “largely uncontrolled and uncontrollable diabetes” who worked at the Cheyenne Veteran Affairs Medical Center, failed his annual fitness exam based on the doctor’s concern about plaintiff’s ability to perform challenging physical tasks. His employer reassigned him to a housekeeping position, which paid $9 per hour less than the boiler operator position. 

In affirming summary judgment for the employer on the Rehabilitation Act claim, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held the plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability, noting that the VA’s safety guidelines excluded those with uncontrolled or poorly controlled insulin-dependent diabetes from boiler plant operator positions and that an operator must be able to react instantly to any dangerous situation with some degree of physical agility, which might include climbing ladders and going up and down stairs quickly. The Court said that the plaintiff “would pose a danger to himself and others should he fall from a ladder” and also cited the testimony of plaintiff’s supervisor that if a boiler were to explode, “the force would bring down the entire building that houses them.”

The plaintiff minimized the dangers of his working as a boiler operator, noting that nearly all of his work was “light duty,“ that he climbed a ladder only occasionally, and had worked in this position for two years without incident.

The Court held that an employer can “set standards not only for the mundane work but also for the exceptional” and can consider the “potentially disastrous effects” if plaintiff cannot respond to that exceptional situation safely and efficiently, so long as the need to perform in an emergency is a “realistic component of the job.” This is especially so, the Court noted, where the physical safety of others may be at risk.

An employer seeking to ensure an employee can respond safely and efficiently to the exceptional situation with potentially disastrous effects should consider including such an explicit requirement in the job description. Challenges to such requirements are likely to come from individuals excluded from the position, whether due to a disability or any other reason. The Wilkerson case establishes that such requirements will be upheld so long as responding to the “worst case scenario,” so to speak, is a “realistic component” of the job.

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Some call obesity the next smoking, meaning that now that employers have had a multi-faceted attack on reducing health costs related to smoking, they will move on to obesity.  The CDC reports that about 34% of U.S. adults are obese, while about 20% of adults smoke. The rate of obesity has been growing rapidly, while the number of smokers has been declining. The annual healthcare costs related to obesity exceed that of smoking.  This focus on obesity leads ineluctably to concerns of “weight discrimination.  

Michigan’s Elliot-Larson Civil Rights Act explicitly bans weight discrimination, but a recently filed case illustrates that weight discrimination does not necessarily have anything to do with obesity.

In Cassandra Marie Smith v. Hooters of Roseville, Inc. and Hooters of America, Ms. Smith alleged she was 5’8”, 145 pounds when Hooters hired her, but two years later, when she weighed 12 ½ pounds less, her employer advised her to join a gym “to lose weight and improve her looks so that she would fit better into the extra small-size uniform.” She alleges that she was placed on 30 day “weight probation” and was constructively discharged that same day “because she was unable to meet the Hooters’ discriminatory and illegal requirements of a ‘Hooters Girl’.” 

Ms. Smith alleges that no one had medical training or other information upon which to base a decision to place her on “weight probation,” that her weight was within the medically acceptable range, and that no one explained the proper fit of the uniform or the degree of “thinness” which would satisfy her employer.  

She claims that being told that she would lose her job because she was not the correct weight is “per se” weight discrimination and that the weight requirement for female employees is per se gender discrimination. She also claimed that her employer’s telling her co-workers that she had been placed on “weight probation” and “giving her an ultimatum to change her appearance and weight in an unrealistic manner,” among other things, intentionally caused her emotional distress,

The Smith case is an anomaly in that the handful of discrimination cases based on weight do not deal with a plaintiff “within range.” What Smith establishes is that weight discrimination and obesity discrimination are two different legal claims. 

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Citing research from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, on June 5, 2010, the New York Times reported that one in five women are obese when they become pregnant.  The article states "obesity might be contributing to record-high rates of Caesarean section and leading to more birth defects and deaths for mothers and babies." 

As well illustrated in the NYT piece, the impact on mothers and their families can be heart-wrenching.  But one back story may be the impact on health care costs.  These are pretty eye-opening statistics ... the kind that often prompt employers to expand their commitment to wellness programs.  

The pregnancy/obesity risk raises some interesting questions.  First, to effectively combat the risk, it would seem as though wellness efforts would need to target women of child-bearing age.  Such a program does not appear to raise risks under HIPAA or the Americans with Disabilities Act because the program would not be based on a factor related to health.   Rather, it would be based on a combination of age and gender. Would this distinction open the door to claims of age or gender discrimination?  

It might depend on how a program was structured.  Ideally, employers would provide "incentives" or "rewards" for women of child-bearing age if they maintained a healthy weight.  This would seem to dodge the gender discrimination issues that drove the Supreme Court's landmark decision in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).  In Johnson Controls, the Court held that Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, forbids sex-specific fetal-protection policies.  But Johnson Controls involved a policy of refusing to employ all women, except those whose infertility was medically documented, in jobs creating potential serious health risks to any fetus carried by a female employee.  Wellness programs properly implemented would provide more favorable treatment to women in this category.

Something for employers to think about as they search for programs that address important social issues that also impact their bottom lines.

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As the ADA's 20th anniversary nears, let's revisit one of its lofty goals: to place a sweeping federal blanket over the patchwork of state and federal laws that protects individuals with disabilities.

A recent Second Circuit opinion leaves no doubt that the patchwork lives on  In Spiegel v. Schulmann, decided on May 6, 2010, a karate instructor claimed his employer fired him because he was obese due to a medical condition. According to the decision, he weighed 300 pounds and his employer told him that he was not be a good role model due to his weight.

The plaintiff sued for disability discrimination under the ADA, the New York State Human Rights  Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.  The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer on the ADA claim. The district court had held that even if obesity were an impairment under the ADA, plaintiff did not produce any evidence to suggest his obesity makes him “unable to perform a major life activity or significantly restricts the condition, manner or duration in which he can perform a major life activity.”  

The New York Human Rights Law protects those with conditions which prevent “the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques,“ a definition broader than the ADA’s. The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer on the state claim, holding that weight is not a “disability” under that law unless the plaintiff produced evidence that he was medically incapable of meeting the employer’s weight requirements, which the plaintiff here did not produce.  

The New York City Human Rights Law’s definition of “disability” is even broader than the state’s, defining disability as “any physical, medical, mental or psychological impairment” of any system of the body. Since no state appellate court has decided whether obesity is a disability under the NYCHRL, the Second Circuit remanded the case to make this determination. 

One termination, three disability laws, three “disability” definitions and three different analyses…. sounds like the patchwork is alive and well. Employers assessing disability discrimination risk must consider all pieces of this patchwork to identify state and local laws offering broader protection than the ADA..

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 Many reasonable accommodation cases are resolved in court but a court is not usually the defendant. But such was the case when a court reporter sued the Office of the Chief Judges of various Illinois circuit courts for failing to accommodate her incontinence. 

In Gratzl v Office of the Chief Judges of the 12^th, 18^th, 19^th and 22^nd Judicial Circuits, decided on April 7, 2010, the plaintiff had suffered from incontinence since approximately 1991. When the OCJ hired her in 2001, they agreed in writing that she would work in the control room only, a position which was compatible with her medical condition. Five years later, the chief judge decided that, to evenly distribute the workload, all court reporters must rotate through all courtrooms, including the control room.

The plaintiff asked that she be allowed to continue working in the control room only as an accommodation. Her doctor told the court that she needed access to a restroom on a moment’s notice. In response, the court proposed that she not be assigned to any courtrooms in which a trial was scheduled or to juvenile courtrooms, which were farther from the restrooms, and that she use a “high sign” to signal the judge that she needed a break. Plaintiff rejected all of these  offers and continued to request to work in the control room only, arguing that such an assignment was feasible because she had had it previously, that other courts have specialists assigned to the control room only, and that her using the “high sign” would be embarrassing.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the OCJ on plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, holding that she was not a qualified individual with a disability because she was “unable to sit in the courtroom during proceedings without disrupting court”  and that her “control room only” request was not a request for a reasonable accommodation.  The court rejected the plaintiff’s “circular” argument that she is qualified for her current job because she was qualified for her previous job with different essential functions. The court said an employer need not maintain a position or structure that, for legitimate reasons, it no longer believes is appropriate and may change an employee’s essential functions.

This case illustrates numerous “reasonable accommodation” principles employers must master.  Presented with a request for a reasonable accommodation, the court engaged appropriately in the “interactive dialogue” to explore options, and offered a series of accommodations which would have enabled plaintiff to perform her responsibilities despite her medical condition. A plaintiff who rejects such accommodations and merely insists on her preferred accommodation is not a qualified individual with a disability and loses the protection of the ADA.

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Welcome to our new Disability, Leave & Health Management Blog. Most would agree that  health and family are the most precious things in life. Most employers recognize this but, as the saying goes, they “have a business to run.” In this blog, we hope to confront some of the more thorny legal and practical issues employers face when managing issues involving employee health, attendance, leave and family responsibilities. Most will involve issues under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII), the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), the Health Insurance Portability Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and analogous state and local laws.

We will try to keep you engaged as courts and federal agencies weigh in on the meaning of reasonable accommodation, the obligations to provide medical leaves, and legal restrictions governing wellness and health promotion programs, medical privacy, and workplace injury prevention efforts. We will strive to keep you informed about significant pieces of proposed legislation, articles or events, such as the recent White House Forum on Workplace Flexibility, that may reshape how we work together in the 21st Century workplace.

So much is happening so fast in the fascinating world of work. We all need to pay attention and have our say about the direction in which this important law should develop. We hope you enjoy our posts and, if you get a chance, send us an email to let us know what you think.

Stay well!

- Frank Alvarez & Mike Soltis
 

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